How the Philosophy of Language Grew Out of Analytic Philosophy by Harris, Daniel W.
How the Philosophy of Language
Grew Out of Analytic Philosophy
Daniel W. Harris*
Abstract
This chapter tells the story of how the philosophy of language, as it exists now,
grew out of work in the history of analytic philosophy. I pay particular atten-
tion to the history of semantics, to debates about propositional content, and
to the origins of contemporary pragmatics and speech-act theory. I identify
an overarching narrative: Many of the ideas that are now used to understand
natural language on its own terms were originally developed not for this pur-
pose, but as methodological tools for diverse philosophical ends.
My task in this chapter is to tell the origin story of the contemporary philosophy
of language as a chapter in the history of analytic philosophy. Rather than aim-
ing for completeness, I will trace out several threads that combine to give a useful
perspective on how the philosophy of language got to where it is now.
In §, I focus on the development of semantics, which began as a collection
of methodological tools for applying formal languages to philosophical problems.
In §, I trace the origins of contemporary debates about the nature of proposi-
tional content. In §, I give a brief history of philosophical work on speech acts
and pragmatics, emphasizing the origins of current debates in conflicting threads
of Wittgenstein’s writing.
Many of the ideas to be canvassed here began their careers as tools for think-
ing about philosophical debates, but have gradually been repurposed as part of
the philosophical and scientific study of natural language. This process has been
*This essay will be published as a chapter in The Cambridge Handbook for the Philosophy of
Language, edited by Piotr Stalmaszczyk. I thank David Pereplyotchik, Elmar Unnsteinsson, and an
anonymous reviewer for helpful feedback.
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both an effect and a cause of increased collaboration between philosophers and
linguists. Whereas the philosophy of language began the th Century as philos-
ophy’s methodological R&D department, it increasingly belongs to the theoretical
wing of an interdisciplinary scientific research program. This reorientation is an
overarching theme of what follows.
Before I begin, a disclaimer: My aim is to outline the major philosophical in-
fluences on the philosophy of language as it is now practiced. This must be distin-
guished from two other possible aims. First, I will not attempt to give an exhaustive
summary of th-century work in the philosophy of language, or to allocate atten-
tion to ideas in accordance with their importance in their historical contexts. I
will, for example, give short shrift to ideas that were highly influential in their day
but that have been mostly cast aside. Second, I will not be concerned exclusively
with what I take to be the correct readings of the historical figures whom I discuss.
Misreadings sometimes have greater influence on subsequent work, and so I will
attend to some of those here.
1 The Origins of Natural-Language Semantics
The aim of natural-language semantics is to build a computational model of how
the meanings of complex expressions compose as a function of their structure and
the meanings of their parts. Semantics is now a thriving interdisciplinary research
program. Philosophers have contributed directly to this program since its begin-
nings, often in collaboration with linguists and sometimes with computer scien-
tists, mathematicians, and psychologists. Philosophers have also tended to take a
particular interest in the applications of semantics to debates elsewhere in philos-
ophy. As semantics has developed into an empirical science, it has also become an
increasingly authoritative source of empirical constraints on philosophical theo-
rizing about language.
The most important figures in the creation of this research program were the
philosophers Donald Davidson (a; b), Richard Montague (a; c;
), and David Lewis (), though many others made important early contri-
butions. Natural-language semantics has been done in a variety of methodolog-
ical frameworks, and philosophers have played an important role in comparing
In particular, Barbara Partee deserves considerable credit both for her own seminal contribu-
tions (collected in Partee a) and for her role in spreading the influence of Montague’s frame-
work. See Partee (b) for a history of early work in natural-language semantics and a memoir
of Partee’s role.
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the foundational assumptions of these frameworks. At present, the most influen-
tial framework is the one codified in textbooks by Heim and Kratzer () and
von Fintel and Heim ().
The early natural-language semanticists drew on a methodological toolkit that
was almost  years in the making—one that analytic philosophers had developed
to study formal languages created for various philosophical ends. What was new in
the work of Davidson, Montague, and Lewis was the idea that this toolkit could be
fruitfully adapted to understand natural language. Earlier philosophers had been
explicitly pessimistic about the prospects of such a project. Nonetheless, it was
these philosophers’ work that made natural-language semantics possible. In the
rest of this section I will survey some of the major contributions to this prehistory
of natural-language semantics.
The semantic study of formal languages grew out of work by Gottlob Frege and
Bertrand Russell on the foundations of mathematics. Their pursuit was logicism,
the attempt to reduce mathematics to purely logical concepts and axioms. This
project demanded a more powerful logic than those previously available, and the
development of this logic required formal languages with greater expressive power
than what had previously been available. The creation and investigation of these
formal languages inaugurated many of the discussions that make up contemporary
philosophy of language.
Frege contributed several lasting insights to the study of how the meaning of
a complex expression is constrained by its structure. He changed the way that
we think about sentence structure by replacing the simple subject–predicate sen-
tence structure of earlier formal languages with a more sophisticated analysis. Each
atomic sentence is built up from a predicate expression and one or more terms
(names or variables), complex sentences may be built up from other sentences us-
ing connectives, and quantifiers may take scope over any sentence or subsentence,
binding variables within it (Frege, ). Frege () argued that expressions’ ref-
erents combine in the way that functions combine with their arguments: sentences
refer to truth values, names refer to objects, predicates refer to concepts (which
Frege identified with functions that map objects to truth values), quantifiers refer
to functions that map concepts to truth values, connectives refer to truth functions,
and so on. As we would now put it, Frege organized the referents of expressions in
different grammatical categories into a hierarchy of semantic types.
Of Frege’s ideas about expressions’ semantic types, perhaps the most enduring
and influential has been his view that quantifiers refer to second-order functions—

functions that contemporary semanticists categorize as type xet; ty functions. For
example, in asserting ‘every philosopher is a scholar’, what we are doing is assert-
ing that the second-level function denoted by ‘every philosopher’ is one that maps
the first-level function denoted by ‘is a scholar’ to truth. By way of tweaks and re-
finements at the hands of Mostowski (), Montague (), and Barwise and
Cooper (), this idea has become the basis for generalized-quantifier theory,
which has been one of the most fruitful areas of natural-language semantics.
The general picture of semantic composition embodied in Frege’s ideas about
semantic composition has been so influential that Heim and Kratzer (, ) open
their textbook by describing their project as ‘the Fregean program’. As most se-
manticists see it, their main goal is to reverse-engineer the function by which the
meanings of complex expressions can be computed from their syntactic structure
and the meanings of their parts. The claim that such a function exists—a claim that
can be made precise in various ways—is the principle of semantic compositional-
ity. Philosophers and linguists at least since Carnap (, ) have credited
Frege with formulating this principle, which has sometimes been called “Frege’s
principle”. Although there can be little doubt that something like compositionality
was at work in Frege’s thinking about his formal language, there has been scholarly
debate about which version of the principle, if any, he believed, and how explicitly.
Even if attributing the principle to Frege involved a misreading, however, this mis-
reading would constitute a momentous influence over the history of semantics.
A second major influence on contemporary thinking about the mechanics of
semantic composition arose from Russell’s () theory of descriptions. Russell
argues that what he calls “denoting phrases”—phrases constructed from a deter-
miner and a noun phrase, as well as words like ‘everything’ and ‘nothing’ that ap-
pear to play the same semantic role—do not “have any meaning in isolation, but a
meaning is assigned to every proposition in which they occur” (Russell, , ).
For example, denoting phrases seem, on the surface, to occupy the same grammat-
ical positions as names and pronouns, apparently as the arguments of predicates.
But Russell argues that denoting phrases in fact take scope over predicates and bind
hidden variables in the argument positions that they appear to occupy. Russell thus
This way of typing functions is a variant of the notation used by Alonzo Church (; )
in formulating his typed lambda calculus. Church’s lambda notation has become a crucial part of
the metalanguage in which contemporary semantics is done.
See Peters and Westerståhl () for a survey of work on quantifiers and Partee () for a
history of their “starring role” in natural language semantics.
For overviews of issues about compositionality, see Dever (, ) and Szabó ().
See Pelletier (), Neale (), and Dever (, §).
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posits a layer of grammatical structure, logical form, that underlies sentences’ sur-
face structure and that must be uncovered via analysis in order to understand how
their contents are structured.
Russell applies this idea in a more extreme way to definite descriptions, arguing
that the logical form of () is best represented (using contemporary notation) as ():
() The king of France is bald.
() pDxqppKx& p@yqpKx y  xqq& Bxq
english gloss: There exists one and only one king of France, and he is bald.
At the level of logical form, then, a definite description is broken apart into a col-
lection of quantifiers, connectives, and bound variables, and sprinkled throughout
the sentence. Russell therefore calls descriptions “incomplete symbols”—symbols
that appear in the surface structure of sentences but that disappear under analysis,
and that therefore have no unified meanings of their own.
Taking things a step further, Russell (, ) argues that many apparently
syntactically unstructured expressions, including most proper names, must be an-
alyzed as definite descriptions (and then further analyzed as above). For example,
the name ‘Bismarck’ might be analyzed as ‘the first Chancellor of the German Em-
pire’ (Russell, , ). For Russell, then, the logical form of any given sentence
may turn out to be radically different than its surface structure would suggest.
Although Frege speculated about how some of his ideas applied to natural lan-
guage (e.g., in Frege ; ), the real purpose of his ideas about the syntax-
semantics interface was to increase the expressive power of his formal language.
Russell () shared this motivation, and also saw his theory of descriptions as
a solution to various logical and metaphysical paradoxes. Russell’s theories of de-
scriptions and proper names also came to play a central role in his theory of em-
pirical knowledge, whose aim was to show how we can have knowledge of the ex-
ternal world beyond what is given in sensation. According to Russell (; ),
the components of the contents of our thoughts are all things with which we are
directly acquainted—sense data, sensible qualities such as colors and shapes, and
perhaps the self. Other entities about which we seem to think and speak are “logi-
cal constructions” out of the objects of acquaintance. What this means in practice
is that when we find a sentence that contains an expression purporting to refer to
something that is not given in perception, we must use Russell’s theory of definite
descriptions to analyze it away. This procedure would normally have to be iter-
ated many times, transforming most sentences into extremely complex statements
about sensory contents.

Russell thus motivated his ideas about logical form by tying them to a founda-
tionalist epistemology, with results that would strike contemporary semanticists
as bizarre. Nonetheless, the idea that natural-language sentences possess a hidden
level of syntactic analysis that is relevant to their semantic interpretation is alive and
well. One vector into contemporary work runs through Davidson (a), who,
building on some ideas of Reichenbach (), argued that sentences describing
actions have logical forms feature event variables bound by covert existential quan-
tifiers. This idea has turned out to have an enormous influence on how semanticists
understand verbs, tense, and aspect in natural language. The idea of logical form
can also be recognized in generative linguistics, where it is common to distinguish
distinguish PF (short for “phonetic form”) from LF (short for “logical form”) as
distinct levels of linguistic representation, the former encoding structure relevant
to pronunciation and the latter encoding structure relevant to semantic interpre-
tation. Some of the main claims of contemporary theories of LF are even recog-
nizably Russellian—for example, in that they render the scopes of quantifiers and
other scope-taking expression structurally explicit.
Russell’s theory of descriptions also lives on, though in altered forms and di-
vorced from his epistemology. For example, Neale () defends a version of
the theory in which definite descriptions are treated as restricted quantifiers rather
than as incomplete symbols in Russell’s sense. Meanwhile, several of the main al-
ternative treatments of definite descriptions can be traced to Frege (), who
argues that definite descriptions, like names, presuppose the existence of their ref-
erents, and fail to refer if their presuppositions are false. The concept of presuppo-
sition, which is often credited to Frege, has now become the subject of a massive
literature in semantics and pragmatics. Many still think of definite descriptions
and other definite noun phrases (including names and pronouns) as triggering pre-
suppositions of various kinds.
Even Russell’s view that most proper names must be analyzed as descriptions
has contemporary successors, although Kripke () is widely seen as having re-
futed the specifics of Russell’s view. Most recently, Fara () has argued that
what appear to be syntactically simple occurrences of proper names are actually
the nominals of definite descriptions that have unpronounced definite determin-
ers, so that the LF of ‘Bertrand was right’ could be more perspicuously represented
See Maienborn  and Williams (this volume) for overviews.
Chomsky (, ); May (, ). Some contemporary linguists reject LF; see, for
example, Barker and Jacobson ().
For an overview of the literature on presupposition, see Beaver and Geurts ().
See, e.g., Roberts ().
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by ‘The Bertrand was right’. Although this is not Russell’s view, he does suggest that
names should sometimes be analyzed as descriptions of the form ‘the person called
n’ (Russell, , ). There are, of course, many alternative theories of names,
some of which I will discuss below. In general, names and descriptions have occu-
pied an outsized role in the philosophy of language, and Frege and Russell continue
to loom over these debates.
Another early th-Century logician whose work contributed some of the basic
ingredients of contemporary semantics is Alfred Tarski, whose theories of truth
(Tarski, , , ) and logical consequence () have both had lasting
influence.
Tarski’s theory of truth is a recipe for assigning truth conditions to sentences
in a formal object language with limited expressive power using an axiomatic the-
ory stated in a formal metalanguage with greater expressive power. Much of this
procedure is visible in most natural-language semantic theories since Davidson
(b). In particular, semantic theories begin with axioms assigning meanings
to primitive expressions in an object language, generate theorems assigning truth
conditions to object-language sentences, and are normally given in a notationally
enriched metalanguage. However, the superficial similarity of Tarski’s truth defini-
tions to contemporary semantic theories masks deep differences in their respective
explanatory goals. Tarski’s procedure begins from assumptions about the mean-
ings of object-language expressions in order to offer a stipulative definition of a
truth predicate. Modern semantic theories, by contrast, takes the notion of truth
as primitive in order to understand the meanings of natural-language expressions.
As Burgess (, ) puts it, “We constantly find in the writings of Davidson
and disciples mentions of a “Tarskian” theory of truth, where “counter-Tarskian”
or “anti-Tarskian” would have been more accurate…”.
Aside from lending a general shape to modern semantic theories, Tarksi’s the-
ory of truth also provided an influential model of variable binding. The method
is this: a variable’s referent is relativized to an arbitrary sequence, or assignment
function. This relativization is inherited by expressions containing the variable, up
until it is bound by a variable-binding expression, such as a quantifier, which ren-
der assignment functions inert. In recent work, the role of assignment functions
has been expanded. Context-sensitive expressions, including unbound pronouns,
are often treated as having assignment-relativized contents, and assignments are
It is noteworthy that the small minority of contemporary semanticists who reject a Tarskian
account of variables call their theory ‘variable-free semantics’ (Jacobson, , ), suggesting
that Tarski’s account has become synonymous with his subject matter.
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thought of as formal stand-ins for the utterance context (Heim and Kratzer, ,
–) or the speaker’s referential intentions (Heim, , –).
Tarski’s theory of logical consequence, unlike the proof-theoretic accounts of
earlier logicians, defines consequence model-theoretically, as the preservation of
truth under arbitrary reinterpretations of non-logical vocabulary (Tarski, ).
Repurposing Tarski’s ideas, Montague (, ) argued that “the construction of
a theory of truth…under an arbitrary interpretation [is] the basic goal of serious
syntax and semantics”. In the hands of contemporary semanticists, Tarski’s theory
has become an essential tool for empirically assessing, since it allows predictions
about logical consequence to be generated from semantic theories, which can then
be tested against the intuitions of native speakers.
A fourth early analytic philosopher whose work continues to exert a major in-
fluence on semantics is Carnap, whose Introduction to Semantics () synthe-
sized and disseminated the semantic ideas of Frege, Russell, and Tarski, and whose
Meaning and Necessity () articulated much of the framework of intensional
semantics that, via Montague, most semanticists still work with.
Carnap’s main innovation was the use of possible worlds, which he modeled as
state descriptions—maximal consistent sets of atomic sentences. His use of possi-
ble worlds allowed Carnap to distinguish between each expression’s intension and
extension—a distinction that is inspired by, though distinct from, Frege’s sense–
reference distinction (Carnap, , §§–). In Carnap’s usage, the extension of
a singular term is the entity to which it refers, the extension of a one-place predi-
cate is the set of entities of which it is true, the extension of a sentence is its truth
value, and so on. An expression’s intension is a function from each possible world
to its extension at that world.
Carnap’s aim in developing his intensional semantics was not to understand
natural language. In Introduction to Semantics, he had distinguished “descrip-
tive semantics”, which is the study of meaning in natural language, from “pure
semantics”, which is the stipulative “construction and analysis of a semantical sys-
tem”, and made it clear that he was interested only in the latter (Carnap, , §).
But Carnap’s ideas were refined over the next two decades, culminating in Mon-
Church (; ) developed his intensional logic in parallel, but Carnap’s formulations have
proven to be more influential.
Carnap (, ) credits Leibniz and Wittgenstein () the inspirations for his use of possible
worlds.
The idea that intensions are functions from worlds to extensions is implicit in Carnap (),
but Montague (, ) reports that Carnap made the idea explicit in conversation, and this is
the implementation that Montague and Lewis popularized.
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tague’s application to natural language. Along the way, important contributions
were made by many logicians, often independently and in parallel. (For the messy
details, see Copeland ().)
One important advance over Carnap’s model was the addition of a binary ac-
cessibility relation over worlds—an idea that was developed independently by Prior
and Meredith (), Hintikka (), and—most famously—Kripke (; ).
Carnap had treated modal operators as unrestricted quantifiers over all state de-
scriptions: ‘Necessarily S’ is true if and only if S is true at every possible world. By
contrast, Kripke’s models treat modals as restricted quantifiers whose domain is
restricted to the worlds that are accessible from the world of evaluation. By placing
different conditions on the accessibility relation and thereby restricting modals’
quantification in different ways, many different modalities can be expressed. The
original point of this complication was to devise soundness and completeness re-
sults for a range of modal systems, but the same idea has turned out to have appli-
cations in natural-language semantics. Most influentially, Kratzer Kratzer (,
) showed how to account for the fact that some modals can express differ-
ent modalities—e.g. ‘must’ can be a deontic or epistemic modal—by arguing that
modals are sensitive to contextually supplied “conversational backgrounds” which
serve to restrict their domains of quantification in different ways. Most of the
enormous contemporary literature on modals takes Kratzer’s work as a jumping-
off point. A similar story can be told about propositional attitude verbs, which,
building on Hintikka’s () early work on epistemic logic, are now likewise of-
ten understood as modals that quantify over sets of worlds that are epistemically
accessible (in various senses).
The treatment of modals as restricted quantifiers over worlds also led to an on-
going explosion of work on conditionals. Two threads in the history of analytic
philosophy had provided fuel. First, C. I. Lewis demonstrated a range of inade-
quacies of the truth-functional conditional of classical logic, gave an axiomatized
treatment of a “strict conditional” that, he thought, did better, and used this strict
conditional to axiomatize several of the systems of modal logic for which Kripke
and others would later prove soundness and completeness theorems (Lewis, ;
Lewis and Langford, ). Lewis thus linked conditionals to modal logic and
sparked interest in both. A second tradition—exemplified by Goodman ()—
identified a web of connections between counterfactual conditionals and a collec-
tion of weighty philosophical topics such as the metaphysics of dispositions and
For a survey on the semantics of natural-language modals, see Portner ().
For the standard textbook treatment of these ideas, see von Fintel and Heim (, ch.).
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causation, the nature of scientific laws, and human agency. The explosion was
sparked by Robert Stalnaker () and David Lewis (), who proposed varia-
tions on the following idea: for a conditional ‘if A then C’ to be true at a possible
world w is for its consequent, ‘C’, to be true at the world or worlds that are most
similar to w and at which its antecedent, ‘A’ is true. This treatment makes the con-
ditional a kind of restricted modal operator that quantifies over a set of worlds
determined by a similarity relation on worlds together with the conditional’s an-
tecedent. Although the Stalanker–Lewis approach is far from the only school of
thought on the semantics of conditionals, it remains the default view that others
attempt to either refine or challenge.
A further important advance over Carnap’s () semantics was the treatment
of possible worlds as primitive elements in the model rather than as state descrip-
tions. For Carnap, ‘necessarily S’ is used to make the claim that S is true in every
state description, which is tantamount to saying that there is no way of reinterpret-
ing the non-logical symbols of the language so as to make S false. The notion of
necessity involved is thus linguistic, corresponding to logical truth or analyticity.
Treating possible worlds as primitive elements in models opens them up to var-
ious interpretations, and allows non-linguistic modalities to be expressed. Most
influentially, Kripke () took the worlds in his models to be the metaphysically
possible worlds, and argued that necessity, analyticity, and a prioricity are distinc-
tively metaphysical, semantic, and epistemic concepts, respectively. Meanwhile,
Prior (; ) devised logics in which tenses are treated as modal operators
that quantify over times rather than worlds. Kripke’s and Prior’s ideas were com-
bined and generalized by Montague (b; c), who took intensions to be
functions from indices to extensions, where each index includes a world, a time,
and possibly other factors on which expressions’ extensions might depend. This
technique would later be further generalized in a wide variety of ways. For ex-
ample, Lewis (a) posits a form of essentially first-personal, or de se content
that can be modeled as functions from a world, a time, and an agent to a truth
value. More recently, relativists of various stripes have argued that indices also in-
clude features that represent the standards relative to which some claims are true
or false.
Another generalization of intensional semantics has formed the basis of the
most influential theories of the context sensitivity of natural-language expressions.
For a summary of work on counterfactual conditionals, see Starr (). For a summary of
work on indicative conditionals, see Edgington ().
On the philosophical significance of this idea, see Soames (, chs.–).
For an overview of recent work on relativism, see Baghramian and Carter(, §).

The standard presentation of this generalization is due to Kaplan (). In addi-
tion to an extension and an intension, Kaplan’s semantics assigns each expression
a character, which can be thought of as a rule for determining the expression’s con-
tent in a given context of utterance. Formally, Kaplan models characters as func-
tions from contexts to intensions, and treats contexts as ordered tuples of entities
that will be present in any real-world context of utterance and on whose identity the
intension of a context-sensitive expression could depend. One of the coordinates of
a context is the speaker, for example, and Kaplan models the character of the word
‘I’ as a function that maps each context to the speaker in that context. Whereas
Montague’s semantics took each expression’s extension to be dependent on a sin-
gle index, Kaplan’s semantics introduced a kind of double indexing, in which one
index represents the way in which expressions’ contents depend on the contexts
in which they are uttered and a second index represents the way in which the cir-
cumstances in which a content is evaluated determined its extension. The idea
of double indexing—sometimes called ‘two dimensional semantics’—has been put
to a surprising number of uses in semantics and in philosophy more generally.
And, in general, an enormous number of natural-language expressions have been
claimed to be context sensitive and given treatments along Kaplanian lines.
Take a course in natural-language semantics and you will likely be taught how
to construct an axiomatic truth theory for a fragment of a natural language. Taking
as its input a sentence’s LF, the theory will assign meanings, modeled as functions
of various types, to the sentence’s simple parts, and will then provide a recipe for
deriving the sentence’s intension by combining these functions with one another.
Although I am leaving out many details and advancements, it should be clear that
contemporary semantic theories are covered with the fingerprints of Frege, Russell,
Tarski, and Carnap.
At the same time, I hope it’s clear that the aim of the game has shifted from
the stipulative construction of philosophical tools to the empirical description and
explanation of natural language. Although many philosophers of language still
attempt to draw philosophical conclusions from semantic theories, empirical ad-
equacy now trumps other ways of evaluating the results. This shift in explanatory
goals happened slowly and not always self consciously, but it has had widespread
ramifications for the philosophy of language—most notably, a much greater inte-
gration with contemporary linguistics.
But see also Kamp () and Vlach ().
For an overview, see Schroeter ().
For a more detailed discussion of this shift and its consequences, see Harris ().

2 Propositional Content
Propositional content is another topic that has been central in the philosophy of
language since the late-th century. Beginning with Frege and Russell, most philoso-
phers have taken propositions to play the following roles: (i) they are abstract enti-
ties that exist independently of human activities, (ii) they are the contents of (uses
of) declarative sentences, (iii) they are the contents of beliefs and other proposi-
tional attitudes, (iv) they have truth conditions and are the primary bearers of
truth and falsity, and (v) they can be communicated from speakers to hearers.
These properties of propositions played an important role in Frege’s broader logi-
cist project by bolstering his vehement anti-psychologism about logic. Many ear-
lier philosophers had taken logic to be the study of abstract properties of human
cognition. But if logic was the study of the objective relations between mind-
independent, truth-value-bearing propositions, as Frege believed, then there was
better hope for logicists of explaining the necessity and objectivity of mathematical
truths. Like contemporary work on semantics, contemporary work on proposi-
tions thus began as a precondition for the logicist program.
Although (i)–(v) articulate what is standardly taken to be the theoretical role of
propositions, each of these claims has been rejected in at least some cases. And
of course, some philosophers—most notably Quine (), Davidson (b), and
one stage of Russell (; ) himself—have denied the existence of proposi-
tions altogether. Among philosophers who accept (i)–(v), there remains consider-
able disagreement.
One influential view is due to Russell (), who thought that the proposition
expressed by a sentence is a structured entity whose parts are the referents of the ex-
pressions that make up the sentence’s logical form. For example, a logically proper
name—i.e., a name that has not been analyzed away at logical form—contributes
its referent to the propositions expressed by sentences in which it occurs, and the
contribution made by a one-place predicate is a property.
Frege () denied that referential contents can do the work of propositions.
The sentence ‘Hesperus is identical to Hesperus’ expresses a trivial truth while the
truth of ‘Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus’ is an empirical discovery. But since
Hesperus is Phosphorus, Frege concluded that names’ contents must be something
other than their referents. Likewise, it could transpire that ‘Beyoncé believes that
Jay Z is the greatest rapper’ is true while ‘Beyoncé believes that Hove is the greatest
See Soames (this volume) and Hanks (this volume) for some of the reasons to reject the idea
that propositions are independent of human activities, for example.
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rapper’ is false, though Jay Z and Hove are the same person. If the truth condi-
tions of a sentence are determined by the referents of its parts, then this would
seem to pose a problem for Russellians, since the two sentences differ only in that
apparently co-referring names have been swapped. To account for these and other
phenomena, Frege and latter-day Fregeans have argued that each expression—each
word, phrase, and sentence—has both a sense and a referent. An expression’s sense
is a particular mode of presentation of its referent, and serves as the expression’s
referent in “indirect” contexts, such as when embedded under attitude verbs. The
senses of sentences, which Frege called “thoughts”, are now usually called “Fregean
propositions”.
Russell () denied the existence of Fregean senses. He handled Frege’s data
by claiming that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are different definite descriptions in
disguise. They therefore contribute different components to the contents of sen-
tences in which they appear and can enter into complex scope relations that he took
to explain their puzzling interactions with attitude verbs. This strategy, which de-
pends on Russell’s alliance of semantics and foundationalist epistemology, is no
longer a popular one. But contemporary Russellians abound, buoyed by Kripke’s
() arguments that names, unlike descriptions, are rigid designators, Kripke’s
() and Putnam’s (; ) arguments that natural-kind terms are rigid des-
ignators, Kaplan’s (; ) arguments that indexicals and demonstratives are
directly referential, and Salmon’s () and Soames’ () sophisticated defenses
of Russellian propositions and directly referential theories of names.
Meanwhile, the emergence of intensional logic in the wake of Carnap ()
(see §), gave rise to the view that propositions are functions from possible worlds
to truth values—or, equivalently, sets of possible worlds. The idea behind this pro-
posal is that the essential job of a proposition is to embody a truth condition. Sets
of worlds are truth conditions incarnate: they do nothing except to specify a truth
value for each way that the world could be.
The idea of possible-worlds propositions has been generalized and modified in
many ways. Possible worlds are maximal ways that a world could be. Semanticists
interested in their non-maximal counterparts—roughly, parts of worlds—tend to
build their propositions out of “situations” or “truthmakers” instead. As I de-
scribed in §, semanticists have also found it useful to generalize intensions so that
For a recent summary of the debate between Russellian and Fregean theories of propositions,
see Caplan ().
Barwise and Perry () were the founders of situation semantics. For an overview, see
Kratzer (). On truthmaker semantics, see Fine (). J. L. Austin () is often credited
with the idea that statements are true or false only with respect to situations.
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they become functions from more complex indices to truth values. And so we find
some theorists debating whether propositions are sets of world–time pairs (Mon-
tague, c), sets of world–time–agent triples (Lewis, a), or sets of some other
complex indices. We can group these proposals together by saying that they treat
propositions as sets of truth-supporting circumstances. 
3 Wittgenstein, Language Use, and Speech-Act Theory
A third major area of current work in the philosophy of language deals with pragmatics—
the theory of how we use language to communicate and to perform speech acts of
various kinds, and of the mechanisms by which discourses evolve. Contemporary
pragmatics developed out of a mid-century movement away from the analysis of
formal languages and toward naturalistic attention to the messy details of ordinary
speech.
The most important source of this tradition is Wittgenstein’s late work. In the
opening passages of thePhilosophical Investigations (/), Wittgenstein crit-
icizes a “philosophical notion of meaning” that “is at home in a primitive idea of
the way language functions” (, §). Among his targets is the idea that under-
standing the meanings of natural-language expressions is a matter of understand-
ing what they refer to. He attributes this picture to Augustine, but also to unnamed
“logicians” (think Frege and Russell) and “the author of the Tractatus Logico Philo-
sophicus”—i.e., his younger self (, §). In place of this picture, Wittgenstein
suggests that we should attend to the multifarious roles that language-use plays in
what he calls “language games”, a term that he uses both for actual games involving
language (§) and also for all of the human activities, or “forms of life”, in which we
use language (§). To understand an expression is to understand the roles it plays
in one or more broader activities. “For a large class of cases of the employment of
the word ‘meaning”’, Wittgenstein says, “this word can be explained in this way:
the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (, §).
According to an influential reading of Wittgenstein, language use and all other
rule-governed activities are essentially social. Driven by their foundationalist
See Soames () for this terminology, and for an influential argument against treating propo-
sitions as sets of truth-supporting circumstances. For philosophical defenses of possible-worlds
propositions, Stalnaker () and Lewis (, §.).
For surveys of the contemporary literature on propositions, see McGrath and Frank () and
Hanks (this volume).
On the controversy over the accuracy of this reading, see Canfield ().
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epistemology, Russell and some of the logical empiricists held that all scientific
truths could, at least in principle, be analyzed into essentially private statements
about the contents of individual agents’ sensations. One important part of the
philosophical context for Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language was his ambition
to demonstrate the incoherence of this project, most famously by objecting to the
idea of private languages that it presupposes.
Wittgenstein’s ideas about language played a central role in his anti-theoretical,
therapeutic approach to philosophy, whose aim was to diagnose and dissolve self-
inflicted philosophical confusion rather than to give theoretical answers to philo-
sophical questions (see, for example, Wittgenstein , §). One source of
philosophers’ confusion, Wittgenstein argued, is their tendency to take a piece of
language that has a clear role in a particular language game and attempt to extend
its use beyond this natural habitat and into philosophical theorizing. “Philosophi-
cal problems arise”, he says, “when language goes on holiday” (, §).
One way that Wittgenstein’s anti-theoretical posture manifests itself is in his
imperviousness to straightforward interpretation. Rather than a theory, what we
find is a discussion with many evocative but difficult-to-reconcile thoughts. This is
particularly true of Wittgenstein’s multifaceted idea of meaning as use. Somewhat
ironically, many of the conflicting facets have grown into competing positions in
contemporary pragmatics, as philosophers have attempted to build Wittgenstein’s
insights into theories. Some of these attempts to tame Wittgenstein’s ideas have
been self conscious and acknowledged. For example, Brandom introduces his own
influential project in the philosophy of language by saying that “one of the over-
arching methodological commitments that orients [his] project is to explain the
meanings of linguistic expressions in terms of their use—an endorsement of one
dimension of Wittgenstein’s pragmatism”. But in order to “work out the details
of a theory of meaning or, for that matter, of use”, Brandom says, we must reject
Wittgenstein’s “theoretical quietism” (Brandom, , xii). Most of the other ma-
jor figures in contemporary pragmatics have been less explicit about their debts to
Wittgenstein, though all can be viewed as attempting to theorize the relationship
between meaning and use that he was the first to posit.
A case in point is Grice’s intentionalist project, which aims to reduce facts about
the semantic properties of linguistic expressions to facts about what speakers mean
by them, and in turn to facts about speakers’ psychology. On Grice’s view, to mean
Wittgenstein’s private-language argument and related remarks about rule following have
spawned an enormous literature, much of it centering on an interpretation due to Kripke ().
For overviews of this literature, see Candlish and Wrisley () and Miller (this volume).
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something is to behave in a way that is intended to change an addressee’s mind, in
part by revealing to them the intention to do so (Grice, , ). Speech acts of
different kinds are intended to change the addressee’s mind in different ways. For
an expression to have a meaning for a group of speakers is for the group members
to have a shared “procedure in their repertoires” to mean something by uttering it
(Grice, ). Grice’s view remains highly influential, both in philosophy and in
the cognitive sciences, where it has animated theories of the cognitive mechanisms
underlying communication, their evolution, and their development in children.
At least part of Grice’s philosophical motivation was to counter the widespread
midcentury skepticism of semantic and psychological notions typified by Quine
(; ) and Ryle (). Later intentionalists would articulate this motivation
more explicitly, arguing that their project was part of a larger attempt to find a place
for meaning in the natural world (Loar, ; Schiffer, ).
Grice () is also responsible for developing the most influential theory of
how we communicate in nonliteral and indirect ways. We do this, he argued, by ex-
ploiting our interlocutors’ tacit cooperativity. By making an utterance that would
be uncooperative if literal, we prompt our interlocutors to avoid that conclusion
by seeking an additional or alternative hypothesis about what we intended. Grice
dubbed this sort of non-literal or indirect act of meaning something an ‘implica-
ture’. Grice’s original philosophical applications of his theory of implicature were
to defend a causal theory of perception (Grice, ) and to dissolve the apparent
methodological tension that divided approaches to philosophy centered around
formal logic and ordinary language, respectively (Grice, , Chs.–). But his
theory has now become enormously influential mainly as a contribution to natural-
language pragmatics.
A second theory of language use to emerge from postwar Oxford was J. L.
Austin’s (; ; ) theory of speech acts. Austin took speech acts to be
conventional procedures—acts that are performed by conforming to social con-
ventions. As one of his paradigm examples, Austin considered the case of per-
forming a marriage ceremony—a ritual whose nature and conditions of successful
performance are bound up with an elaborate social institution.
Austin held that a speech act can be analyzed at several levels of abstraction.
A single utterance may constitute a locutionary act of saying that the addressee’s
dog is poorly trained, an illocutionary act of insulting them, and a perlocutionary
See also Bach and Harnish (); Schiffer (); Strawson ().
Later intentionalists, inspired by Lewis (, ), replaced Grice’s talk of procedures with a
theories of linguistic convention (Loar, , ; Schiffer, , ).
Scott-Phillips (); Sperber and Wilson (, ); Tomasello (, ).
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act of offending them. Locutionary acts are individuated in terms of their sense
and reference (Austin, , ), illocutionary acts are individuated by their force,
which Austin takes to be governed by the social conventions, and perlocutionary
acts are individuated in terms of their extra-conventional effects. Searle (;
) reworked Austin’s locution–illocution distinction as the distinction between
the propositional content and force of an illocutionary act, and this distinction is
still widely assumed, even among non-conventionalists.
A third approach to the connection between meaning and use to arise in Wittgen-
stein’s wake was due to Wilfrid Sellars (; ), one of whose defining legacies
is his formulation of a functionalist theory of both linguistic and mental content.
On Sellars’ view—contra (e.g.) Grice—mental states have no explanatory priority
over speech acts, and the contentfulness of both is to be explained in terms of the
overall functional roles they play in an agent’s perceptions, inferences, and actions.
In developing this view, Sellars emphasized the sociality of language, saying that,
“As Wittgenstein has stressed, it is the linguistic community as a self perpetuat-
ing whole which is the minimum unit in terms of which conceptual activity can
be understood” (). For Sellars, this makes language use, and intentionality
in general, a form of “norm-conforming behavior”—an activity whose moves are
governed by social rules (Sellars, , ).
Two contemporary approaches to speech acts build on Sellars’ ideas. The
most influential defender of the first is Robert Brandom (; ; ), who
has sought to understand the nature of human thought, language use, and rational-
ity in terms of the roles that these activities play within a language game of giving
and asking for reasons (, ch.). Speech acts, on Brandom’s view, are public
moves within this language game, and Brandom thinks of them, fundamentally,
as undertakings of social commitments. A second strand was first developed by
Ruth Garrett Millikan, who understands speech acts in terms of their proper func-
tion of producing certain effects in addressees. An speech act proper function may
Austin spent the first half How to doThings withWords on a precursor view according to which
utterances can be divided into constatives (statements and their ilk) and performatives. (See also
Austin .) Austin spends so much time on this view only to abandon it because one of the nega-
tive goals of Austin’s lectures is to undermine the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive
sentences, which had central to the philosophical methodology of the logical empiricists.
The basic idea behind this distinction goes back to Frege (), whose formal language dis-
tinguishes contents from the act of judging or asserting them, and whose Foundations of Arithmetic
() was translated into English by Austin.
On the relationship between the two, see Millikan ().
For some related views, see Geurts (); Kukla (); Kukla and Lance (); MacFarlane
(); Peregrin (); Tirrell ().
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be the result of a natural-selection-like process of differential reproduction, and
needn’t involve intentionns on the part of the speaker (; ). This idea has
been further developed by signaling theorists using the tools of evolutionary game
theory (Skyrms, ; Zollman, ).
Another influential midcentury attempt to connect linguistic meaning to lan-
guage use is due to Michael Dummett, who argued that the aim of a theory of mean-
ing is to say both “what the speaker knows, but also how his knowledge is mani-
fested” (Dummett, , ). Since our knowledge of language is implicit, Dum-
mett argued, to understand how a speaker manifests their knowledge of language is
to understand how they use language. Synthesizing ideas that he finds in Frege and
Wittgenstein, Dummett argued that the publicity of the sense of a word required
it to be “uniquely determined by the observable features of [the word’s] linguistic
employment…; it follows that a grasp of its sense is fully manifested by the man-
ner in which the speaker employs it” (Dummett, , ). One consequence of
this view, according to Dummett, is that the notion of warranted assertibility must
play some of the roles that truth is normally taken to play in semantic theorizing.
Although most of the details of Dummett’s philosophy of language have lost cur-
rency, the idea of warranted assertion—and, in particular, the broader question of
what epistemic norm(s) govern assertion—has turned out to be enormously influ-
ential. Most notably, Dummett’s student, Timothy Williamson (; ), has
argued that what makes a speech act an assertion is that it is governed by the norm
that one must assert only what one knows. This claim has given rise to a substan-
tial literature in which theorists assume that assertion can be characterized by an
epistemic norm and proceed to debate the nature of this norm.
Two other traditions of theorizing about language use take inspiration from
Wittgenstein’s (, –) claim that first-person attitude ascriptions should be
understood as direct expressions of the states that they purport to report. For
example, Wittgenstein says that uttering ‘I am in pain’ is better understood by
analogy to moaning in pain than to description of someone’s mental state. This
view can now be seen as an early instance of expressivism, which is a loose col-
lection of theories united by the idea that some or all apparently factual claims
are actually something else in disguise. For example, metaethical expressivism
is the view that what appear to be ethical assertions are actually better understood
The notion of warranted assertibility is originally due to Dewey ().
For a summary, see Pagin (, §.).
Another source of expressivism is the view, which can be traced back to Wittgenstein (Wittgen-
stein, , §§., .–) via the logical empiricists (e.g. Ayer ; Carnap ; ), that
many normative and philosophical claims lack cognitive content.
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in some other way—as expressions of emotion (Ayer, ; Stevenson, ), as
prescriptions (Hare, ), or as expressions of motivational states (Blackburn,
; Charlow, ; Gibbard, ). Expressivisms have also been developed to
make sense of epistemic vocabulary (Yalcin, , , ), ontological claims
(Carnap, ; Flocke, fc), and, following Wittgenstein, first-person ascriptions
(Austin, ; Lawlor, ; Wisdom, ). In the extreme, global expressivists
extend nonfactualism to all purportedly factual statements (Price, ).
A second tradition that draws on Wittgenstein’s ideas about self-expression
takes the expression of mental states to be the fundamental concept in a theory
of speech acts. To perform a speech act, on this view, just is to express a state of
mind, and speech acts of different kinds express different kinds of mental states.
Expression theorists disagree about how to understand the expression relation, but
they agree that it needn’t involve Gricean intentions, conventions, or normatively
loaded social commitments, and this makes their view a distinctive take on the
nature of speech acts.
A final contemporary take on language use thinks of communication as unfold-
ing around shared contexts, understood as bodies of representations that change
in response to speech acts and that affect how future speech acts are affected in
turn. One source of these models is Stalnaker (), who models contexts as sets
of propositions that participants treat as common ground. Stalnaker’s most direct
influences were Grice and Schiffer, who had understood speech acts in terms of
their intended effects on addressees’ minds. Stalnaker, by contrast, understands
speech acts in terms of their effects on the information shared by all participants
in a conversation. A second source of context-centric models is Lewis, who, with a
nod to Wittgenstein, titled his seminal paper on the topic, ‘Scorekeeping in a Lan-
guage Game’ (b). Lewis generalizes Stalnaker’s model by adding various com-
ponents to contexts, which he dubs ‘conversational scoreboards’. Just as a baseball
game’s current score tracks past events in the game and constrains what can happen
next, Lewis argues that a conversation’s score (i.e., its context) tracks information
put there by previous speech acts and determines which ones can be felicitously
performed going forward. Models along these lines animate much contemporary
work in pragmatics, and can be interpreted in ways that are compatible with many
of the foregoing foundational views about language use.
For a history of metaethical expressivism, see Schroeder ().
See, e.g. Bar-On (, ); Davis (); Devitt (); Green (); Pagin (); Rosen-
thal (); Turri (). On the connection to Wittgenstein, see (Green, , ) and especially
Bar-On ().
For an overview, see Harris et al (, §.).

4 Loose Ends
With more space, other tales of the recent history of the philosophy of language
could be told. Of the topics that I regret having to leave out, some are covered else-
where in this book: truth (see the chapter by Raatikainen), generative linguistics
(Ludlow; Jakielaszek), internalism and externalism (Collins), the relationship be-
tween semantics and metaphysics (Fox), and the semantics–pragmatics interface
(Del Pinal; Kijania-Placek) are all areas with interesting historical relationships to
analytic philosophy.
With the space available, I hope to have given a variety of instances of what
I take to be a general historical pattern. Analytic philosophy, though preoccupied
with its own philosophical concerns, was also an enormously productive workshop
for the creation of tools for studying natural language.
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